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Abstract
In the context of advertising auctions, finding good reserve prices is a notoriously
challenging learning problem. This is due to the heterogeneity of ad opportunity
types, and the non-convexity of the objective function. In this work, we show how
to reduce reserve price optimization to the standard setting of prediction under
squared loss, a well understood problem in the learning community. We further
bound the gap between the expected bid and revenue in terms of the average loss
of the predictor. This is the first result that formally relates the revenue gained to
the quality of a standard machine learned model.
1 Introduction
A crucial task for revenue optimization in auctions is setting a good reserve (or minimum) price. Set
it too low, and the sale may yield little revenue, set it too high and there may not be anyone willing
to buy the item. The celebrated work by Myerson [1981] shows how to optimally set reserves in
second price auctions, provided the value distribution of each bidder is known.
In practice there are two challenges that make this problem significantly more complicated. First,
the value distribution is never known directly; rather, the auctioneer can only observe samples drawn
from it. Second, in the context of ad auctions, the items for sale (impressions) are heterogeneous, and
there are literally trillions of different types of items being sold. It is therefore likely that a specific
type of item has never been observed previously, and no information about its value is known.
A standard machine learning approach addressing the heterogeneity problem is to parametrize each
impression by a feature vector, with the underlying assumption that bids observed from auctions
with similar features will be similar. In online advertising. these features encode, for instance, the
ad size, whether it’s mobile or desktop, etc.
The question is, then, how to use the features to set a good reserve price for a particular ad opportu-
nity. On the face of it, this sounds like a standard machine learning question—given a set of features,
predict the value of the maximum bid. The difficulty comes from the shape of the loss function.
Much of the machine learning literature is concerned with optimizing well behaved loss functions,
such as squared loss, or hinge loss. The revenue function, on the other hand is non-continuous and
strongly non-concave, making a direct attack a challenging proposition.
In this work we take a different approach and reduce the problem of finding good reserve prices to
a prediction problem under the squared loss. In this way we can rely upon many widely available
and scalable algorithms developed to minimize this objective. We proceed by using the predictor to
define a judicious clustering of the data, and then compute the empirically maximizing reserve price
for each group. Our reduction is simple and practical, and directly ties the revenue gained by the
algorithm to the prediction error.
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1.1 Related Work
Optimizing revenue in auctions has been a rich area of study, beginning with the seminal work
of Myerson [1981] who introduced optimal auction design. Follow up work by Chawla et al.
[2007] and Hartline and Roughgarden [2009], among others, refined his results to increasingly
more complex settings, taking into account multiple items, diverse demand functions, and weaker
assumptions on the shape of the value distributions.
Most of the classical literature on revenue optimization focuses on the design of optimal auctions
when the bidding distribution of buyers is known. More recent work has considered the compu-
tational and information theoretic challenges in learning optimal auctions from data. A long line
of work [Cole and Roughgarden, 2015, Devanur et al., 2016, Dhangwatnotai et al., 2015, Morgen-
stern and Roughgarden, 2015, 2016] analyzes the sample complexity of designing optimal auctions.
The main contribution of this direction is to show that under fairly general bidding scenarios, a
near-optimal auction can be designed knowing only a polynomial number of samples from bidders’
valuations. Other authors, [Leme et al., 2016, Roughgarden and Wang, 2016] have focused on the
computational complexity of finding optimal reserve prices from samples, showing that even for
simple mechanisms the problem is often NP-hard to solve directly.
Another well studied approach to data-driven revenue optimization is that of online learning. Here,
auctions occur one at a time, and the learning algorithm must compute prices as a function of the his-
tory of the algorithm. These algorithms generally make no distributional assumptions and measure
their performance in terms of regret: the difference between the algorithm’s performance and the
performance of the best fixed reserve price in hindsight. Kleinberg and Leighton [2003] developed
an online revenue optimization algorithm for posted-price auctions that achieves low regret. Their
work was later extended to second-price auctions by Cesa-Bianchi et al. [2015].
A natural approach in both of these settings is to attempt to predict an optimal reserve price, equiv-
alently the highest bid submitted by any of the buyers. While the problem of learning this reserve
price is well understood for the simplistic model of buyers with i.i.d. valuations [Cesa-Bianchi et al.,
2015, Devanur et al., 2016, Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003], the problem becomes much more chal-
lenging in practice, when the valuations of a buyer also depend on features associated with the ad
opportunity (for instance user demographics, and publisher information).
This problem is not nearly as well understood as its i.i.d. counterpart. Mohri and Medina [2014]
provide learning guarantees and an algorithm based on DC programming to optimize revenue in
second-price auctions with reserve. The proposed algorithm, however, does not easily scale to large
auction data sets as each iteration involves solving a convex optimization problem. A smoother
version of this algorithm is given by [Rudolph et al., 2016]. However, being a highly non-convex
problem, neither algorithm provides a guarantee on the revenue attainable by the algorithm’s output.
Devanur et al. [2016] give sample complexity bounds on the design of optimal auctions with side
information. However, the authors consider only cases where this side information is given by
σ ∈ [0, 1]. More importantly, their proposed algorithm only works under the unverifiable assumption
that the conditional distributions of bids given σ satisfy stochastic dominance.
Our results. We show that given a predictor of the bid with squared loss of η2, we can construct
a reserve function r that extracts all but g(η) revenue, for a simple increasing function g. (See
Theorem 2 for the exact statement.) To the best of our knowledge, this is the first result that ties
the revenue one can achieve directly to the quality of a standard prediction task. Our algorithm for
computing r is scalable, practical, and efficient.
Along the way we show what kinds of distributions are amenable to revenue optimization via reserve
prices. We prove that when bids are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution F , the ratio between the mean bid
and the revenue extracted with the optimum monopoly reserve scales as O(logVar(F )) – Theorem
5. This result refines the log h bound derived by Goldberg et al. [2001], and formalizes the intuition
that reserve prices are more successful for low variance distributions.
2 Setup
We consider a repeated posted price auction setup where every auction is parametrized by a feature
vector x ∈ X and a bid b ∈ [0, 1]. Let D be a distribution over X × [0, 1]. Let h : X → [0, 1], be a
bid prediction function and denote by η2 the squared loss incurred by h:
E[(h(x)− b)2] = η2.
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We assume h is given, and make no assumption on the structure of h or how it is obtained. Notice
that while the existence of such h is not guaranteed for all values of η, using historical data one
could use one of multiple readily available regression algorithms to find the best hypothesis h.
Let S = ((x1, b1), . . . , (xm, bm)) ∼ D be a set of m i.i.d. samples drawn from D and denote by
SX = (x1, . . . , xm) its projection on X . Given a price p let Rev(p, b) = p1b≥p denote the revenue
obtained when the bidder bids b. For a reserve price function r : X → [0, 1] we let:
R(r) = E
(x,b)∼D
[
Rev(r(x), b)
]
and R̂(r) = 1
m
∑
(x,b)∈S
Rev(r(x), b)
denote the expected and empirical revenue of reserve price function r.
We also let B = E[b], B̂ = 1m
∑m
i=1 bi denote the population and empirical mean bid, and S(r) =
B − R(r), Ŝ(r) = B̂ − R̂(r) denote the expected and empirical separation between bid values
and the revenue. Notice that for a given reserve price function r, S(r) corresponds to revenue left
on the table. Our goal is, given S and h, to find a function r that maximizes R(r) or equivalently
minimizes S(r).
2.1 Generalization Error
Note that in our set up we are only given samples from the distribution, D, but aim to maximize the
expected revenue. Understanding the difference between the empirical performance of an algorithm
and its expected performance, also known as the generalization error, is a key tenet of learning
theory.
At a high level, the generalization error is a function of the training set size: larger training sets lead
to smaller generalization error; and the inherent complexity of the learning algorithm: simple rules
such as linear classifiers generalize better than more complex ones.
In this paper we characterize the complexity of a class G of functions by its growth function Π. The
growth function corresponds to the maximum number of binary labelings that can be obtained by
G over all possible samples SX . It is closely related to the VC-dimension when G takes values in
{0, 1} and to the pseudo-dimension [Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2015, Mohri et al., 2012] when
G takes values in R.
We can give a bound on the generalization error associated with minimizing the empirical separation
over a class of functions G. The following theorem is an adaptation of Theorem 1 of [Mohri and
Medina, 2014] to our particular setup.
Theorem 1. Let δ > 0, with probability at least 1− δ over the choice of the sample S the following
bound holds uniformly for r ∈ G
S(r) ≤ Ŝ(r) + 2
√
log 1/δ
2m
+ 4
√
2 log(Π(G,m))
m
. (1)
Therefore, in order to minimize the expected separation S(r) it suffices to minimize the empirical
separation Ŝ(r) over a class of functions G whose growth function scales polynomially in m.
3 Warmup
In order to better understand the problem at hand, we begin by introducing a straightforward mech-
anism for transforming the hypothesis function h to a reserve price function r with guarantees on its
achievable revenue.
Lemma 1. Let r : X → [0, 1] be defined by r(x) := max(h(x) − η2/3, 0). The function r then
satisfies S(r) ≤ η1/2 + 2η2/3.
The proof is a simple application of Jensen’s and Markov’s inequalities and it is deferred to Ap-
pendix B.
This surprisingly simple algorithm shows there are ways to obtain revenue guarantees from a simple
regressor. To the best of our knowledge these is the first guarantee of its kind. The reader may be
3
curious about the choice of η2/3 as the offset in our reserve price function. We will show that the
dependence on η2/3 is not a simple artifact of our analysis, but a cost inherent to the problem of
revenue optimization.
Moreover, observe that this simple algorithm fixes a static offset, and does not make a distinction
between those parts of the feature space, where the algorithm makes a low error, and those where the
error is relatively high. By contrast our proposed algorithm partitions the space appropriately and
calculates a different reserve for each partition. More importantly we will provide a data dependent
bound on the performance of our algorithm that only in the worst case scenario behaves like η2/3.
4 Results Overview
In principle to maximize revenue we need to find a class of functions G with small complexity, but
that contains a function which approximately minimizes the empirical separation. The challenge
comes from the fact that the revenue function, Rev, is not continuous and highly non-concave—a
small change in the price, p, may lead to very large changes in revenue. This is the main reason why
simply using the predictor h(x) as a proxy for a reserve function is a poor choice, even if its average
error, η2 is small. For example a function h, that is just as likely to over-predict by η as to under
predict by η will have very small error, but lead to 0 revenue in half the cases.
A solution on the other end of the spectrum would simply memorize the optimum prices from the
sample S, setting r(xi) = bi. While this leads to optimal empirical revenue, a function class G
containing r would satisfy Π(G,m) = 2m, making the bound of Theorem 1 vacuous.
In this work we introduce a family G(h, k) of classes parameterized by k ∈ N. This family admits
an approximate minimizer that can be computed in polynomial time, has low generalization error,
and achieves provable guarantees to the overall revenue.
More precisely, we show that given S, and a hypothesis h with expected squared loss of η2:
• For every k ≥ 1 there exists a set of functionsG(h, k) such that Π(G(h, k),m) = O(m2k).
• For every k ≥ 1, there is a polynomial time algorithm that outputs rk ∈ G(h, k) such that
in the worst case scenario Ŝ(rk) is bounded by O( 1k2/3 + η
2/3 + 1
m1/6
).
Effectively, we show how to transform any classifier h with low squared loss, η2, to a reserve price
predictor that recovers all but O(η2/3) revenue in expectation.
4.1 Algorithm Description
In this section we give an overview of the algorithm that uses both the predictor h and the set of
samples in S to develop a pricing function r. Our approach has two steps. First we partition the
set of feasible prices, 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, into k partitions, C1, C2, . . . , Ck. The exact boundaries between
partitions depend on the samples S and their predicted values, as given by h. For each partition
we find the price that maximizes the empirical revenue in the partition. We let r(x) return the
empirically optimum price in the partition that contains h(x).
For a more formal description, let Tk be the set of k-partitions of the interval [0, 1] that is:
Tk = {t = (t0, t1, . . . , tk−1, tk) | 0 = t0 < . . . < tk = 1}.
We define G(h, k) = {x 7→ ∑k−1j=0 ri1tj≤h(x)<tj+1 | rj ∈ [ti, tj+1] and t ∈ Tk}. A function in
G(h, k) chooses k level sets of h and k reserve prices. Given x, price rj is chosen if x falls on the
j-th level set.
It remains to define the function rk ∈ G(h, k). Given a partition vector t ∈ Tk, let the partition
Ch = {Ch1 , . . . , Chk } of X be given by Chj = {x ∈ X |tj−1 < h(x) ≤ tj}. Let mj = |SX ∩ Chj | be
the number of elements that fall into the j-th partition.
We define the predicted mean and variance of each group Chj as
µhj =
1
mj
∑
xi∈Chj
h(xi) and (σhj )
2 =
1
mj
∑
xi∈Chj
(h(xi)− µj)2.
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Reserve Inference from ClustersCompute th ∈ Tk that minimizes 1m
∑k−1
j=0 mjσ
h
j .
Let Ch = Ch1 , Ch2 , . . . , Chk be the induced partitions.
For each j ∈ 1, . . . , k, set rj = maxr r · |{i|bi ≥ r ∧ xi ∈ Chj }|.
Return x 7→∑k−1j=0 rj1h(x)∈Chj .
We are now ready to present algorithm RIC-h for computing rk ∈ Hk.
Our main theorem states that the separation of rk is bounded by the cluster variance of Ch. For a
partition C = {C1, . . . , Ck} of X let σj denote the empirical variance of bids for auctions in Cj . We
define the weighted empirical variance by:
Φ(C) : =
k∑
j=1
√ ∑
i,i′:xi,xi′∈Ck
(bi − bi′)2 = 2
k∑
j=1
mj σ̂j (2)
Theorem 2. Let δ > 0 and let rk denote the output of Algorithm 4.1 then rk ∈ G(h, k) and with
probability at least 1− δ over the samples S:
Ŝ(rk) ≤ (3B̂)1/3
( 1
2m
Φ(Ch)
)
≤ (3B̂)1/3
( 1
2k
+ 2
(
η2 +
√
log 1/δ
2m
)1/2)2/3
.
Notice that our bound is data dependent and only in he worst case scenario it behaves like η2/3. In
general it could be much smaller.
We also show that the complexity of G(h, k) admits a favorable bound. The proof is similar to that
in [Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2015]; we include it in Appendix E for completness.
Theorem 3. The growth function of the classG(h, k) can be bounded as: Π(G(h, k),m) ≤ m2k−1
kk
.
We can combine these results with Equation 1 and an easy bound on B̂ in terms of B to conclude:
Corollary 1. Let δ > 0 and let rk denote the output of Algorithm 4.1 then rk ∈ G(h, k) and with
probability at least 1− δ over the samples S:
S(rk) ≤ (3B̂)1/3
(Φ(Ch)
2m
)
+O
(√k logm
m
)
≤ (12Bη2)1/3+O
( 1
k2/3
+
( log 1/δ
2m
)1/6
+
√
k logm
m
)
.
Since B ∈ [0, 1], this implies that when k = Θ(m3/7), the separation is bounded by 2.28η2/3 plus
additional error factors that go to 0 with the number of samples, m, as O˜(m−2/7).
5 Bounding Separation
In this section we prove the main bound motivating our algorithm. This bound relates the variance
of the bid distribution and the maximum revenue that can be extracted when a buyer’s bids follow
such distribution. It formally shows what makes a distribution amenable to revenue optimization.
To gain intuition for the kind of bound we are striving for, consider a bid distribution F . If the
variance of F is 0, that is F is a point mass at some value v, then setting a reserve price to v leads to
no separation. On the other hand, consider the equal revenue distribution, with F (x) = 1−1/x. Here
any reserve price leads to revenue of 1. However, the distribution has unbounded expected bid and
variance, so it is not too surprising that more revenue cannot be extracted. We make this connection
precise, showing that after setting the optimal reserve price, the separation can be bounded by a
function of the variance of the distribution.
Given any bid distribution F over [0, 1] we denote by G(r) = 1 − limr′→r− F (r′) the probability
that a bid is greater than or equal to r. Finally, we will let R = maxr rG(r) denote the maximum
revenue achievable when facing a bidder whose bids are drawn from distribution F . As before we
denote by B = Eb∼F [b] the mean bid and by S = B −R the expected separation of distribution F .
Theorem 4. Let σ2 denote the variance of F . Then σ2 ≥ 2R2e SR −B2 −R2.
The proof of this theorem is highly technical and we present it in Appendix A.
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Corollary 2. The following bound holds for any distribution F: S ≤ (3R)1/3σ2/3 ≤ (3B)1/3σ2/3
The proof of this corollary follows immediately by an application of Taylor’s theorem to the bound
of Theorem 4. It is also easy to show that this bound is tight (see Appendix D).
5.1 Approximating Maximum Revenue
In their seminal work Goldberg et al. [2001] showed that when faced with a bidder drawing values
distribution F on [1,M ] with mean B, an auctioneer setting the optimum monopoly reserve would
recover at least Ω(B/ logM) revenue. We show how to adapt the result of Theorem 4 to refine this
approximation ratio as a function of the variance of F . We defer the proof to Appendix B.
Theorem 5. For any distribution F with mean B and variance σ2, the maximum revenue with
monopoly reserves, R, satisfies: BR ≤ 4.78 + 2 log
(
1 + σ
2
B2
)
Note that since σ2 ≤M2 this always leads to a tighter bound on the revenue.
5.2 Partition of X
Corollary 2 suggests clustering points in such a way that the variance of the bids in each cluster
is minimized. Given a partition C = {C1, . . . , Ck} of X we denote by mj = |SX ∪ Cj |, B̂j =
1
mj
∑
i:xi∈Cj bi, σ̂
2
j =
1
mj
∑
i:xi∈Cj (bi− B̂j)2. Let also rj = argmaxp>0 p|{bi > p|xi ∈ Cj}| and
R̂j = rj |{bi > rj |xi ∈ Cj}|.
Lemma 2. Let r(x) =
∑k
j=1 rj1x∈Cj then Ŝ(r) ≤
(
3B̂
)1/3(
1
m
∑k
j=1mj σ̂j
)2/3
=(
3B̂
)1/3(
1
2mΦ(C)
)
.
Proof. Let Ŝj = B̂j−R̂j , Corollary 2 applied to the empirical bid distribution in Cj yields Ŝj≤
(3B̂j)
1/3σ̂
2/3
j . Multiplying by
mj
m , summing over all clusters and using Ho¨lder’s inequality gives:
Ŝ(r) =
1
m
k∑
j=1
mjSj ≤ 1
m
k∑
j=1
(3B̂j)
1/3σ̂
2/3
j mj ≤
( k∑
j=1
3mj
m
B̂j
)1/3( k∑
j=1
mj
m
σ̂j
)2/3
.
6 Clustering Algorithm
In view of Lemma 2 and since the quantity B̂ is fixed, we can find a function minimizing the
expected separation by finding a partition of X that minimizes the weighted variance Φ(C) defined
Section 4.1. From the definition of Φ, this problem resembles a traditional k-means clustering
problem with distance function d(xi, xi′) = (bi−bi′)2. Thus, one could use one of several clustering
algorithms to solve it. Nevertheless, in order to allocate a new point x ∈ X to a cluster, we would
require access to the bid b which at evaluation time is unknown. Instead, we show how to utilize the
predictions of h to define an almost optimal clustering of X .
For any partition C = {C1, . . . , Ck} of X define
Φh(C) =
k∑
j=1
√ ∑
i,i′:xi,xi′∈Ck
(h(xi)− h(xi′))2.
Notice that 12mΦh(C) is the function minimized by Algorithm 4.1. The following lemma, proved in
Appendix B, bounds the cluster variance achieved by clustering bids according to their predictions.
Lemma 3. Let h be a function such that 1m
∑m
i=1(h(xi)−bi)2 ≤ η̂2, and let C∗ denote the partition
that minimizes Φ(C). If Ch minimizes Φh(C) then Φ(Ch) ≤ Φ(C∗) + 4mη̂.
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Corollary 3. Let rk be the output of Algorithm 4.1. If 1m
∑m
j=1(h(xi)− bi)2 ≤ η̂2 then:
Ŝ(rk) ≤ (3B̂)1/3
( 1
2m
Φ(Ch)
)2/3
≤ (3B̂)1/3Big( 1
2m
Φ(C∗) + 2η̂
)2/3
. (3)
Proof. It is easy to see that the elements Chj of Ch are of the form Cj = {x|tj ≤ h(x) ≤ tj+1} for
t ∈ Tk. Thus if rk is the hypothesis induced by the partition Ch, then rk ∈ G(h, k). The result now
follows by definition of Φ and lemmas 2 and 3.
The proof of Theorem 2 is now straightforward. Define a partition C by xi ∈ Cj if bi ∈
[
j−1
k ,
j
k
]
.
Since (bi − bi′)2 ≤ 1k2 for bi, bi′ ∈ Cj we have
Φ(C) ≤
k∑
j=1
√
m2j
k2
=
m
k
. (4)
Furthermore since E[(h(x)− b)2] ≤ η2, Hoeffding’s inequality implies that with probability 1− δ:
1
m
m∑
i=1
(h(xi)− bi)2 ≤
(
η2 +
√
log 1/δ
2m
)
. (5)
In view of inequalities (4) and (5) as well as Corollary 3 we have:
Ŝ(rk) ≤ (3B̂)1/3
(
1
2m
Φ(C)+2
(
η2+
√
log 1/δ
2m
)1/2)2/3
≤ (3B̂)1/3
( 1
2k
+2
(
η2+
√
log 1/δ
2m
)1/2)2/3
This completes the proof of the main result. To implement the algorithm, note that the problem
of minimizing Φh(C) reduces to finding a partition t ∈ Tk such that the sum of the variances
within the partitions is minimized. It is clear that it suffices to consider points tj in the set B =
{h(x1), . . . , h(xm)}. With this observation, a simple dynamic program leads to a polynomial time
algorithm with an O(km2) running time (see Appendix C).
7 Experiments
We now compare the performance of our algorithm against the following baselines:
1. The offset algorithm presented in Section 3, where instead of using the theoretical offset
η2/3 we find the optimal tmaximizing the empirical revenue
∑m
i=1
(
h(xi)−t)1h(xi)−t≤bi .
2. The DC algorithm introduced by Mohri and Medina [2014], which represents the state of
the art in learning a revenue optimal reserve price.
Synthetic data. We begin by running experiments on synthetic data to demonstrate the regimes
where each algorithm excels. We generate feature vectors xi ∈ R10 with coordinates sampled from
a mixture of lognormal distributions with means µ1 = 0, µ2 = 1, variance σ1 = σ2 = 0.5 and
mixture parameter p = 0.5. Let 1 ∈ Rd denote the vector with entries set to 1. Bids are generated
according to two different scenarios:
Linear Bids bi generated according to bi = max(x>i 1 + βi, 0) where βi is a Gaussian random
variable with mean 0, and standard deviation σ ∈ {0.01, 0.1, 1.0, 2.0, 4.0}.
Bimodal Bids bi generated according to the following rule: let si = max(x>i 1 + βi, 0) if si > 30
then bi = 40 + αi otherwise bi = si. Here αi has the same distribution as βi.
The linear scenario demonstrates what happens when we have a good estimate of the bids. The
bimodal scenario models a buyer, which for the most part will bid as a continuous function of
features but that is interested in a particular set of objects (for instance retargeting buyers in online
advertisement) for which she is willing to pay a much higher price.
For each experiment we generated a training dataset Strain, a holdout set Sholdout and a test set
Stest each with 16,000 examples. The function h used by RIC-h and the offset algorithm is found
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 1: (a) Mean revenue of the three algorithms on the linear scenario. (b) Mean revenue of the
three algorithms on the bimodal scenario. (c) Mean revenue on auction data.
by training a linear regressor over Strain. For efficiency, we ran RIC-h algorithm on quantizations
of predictions h(xi). Quantized predictions belong to one of 1000 buckets over the interval [0, 50].
Finally, the choice of hyperparameters γ for the Lipchitz loss and k for the clustering algorithm was
done by selecting the best performing parameter over the holdout set. Following the suggestions in
[Mohri and Medina, 2014] we chose γ ∈ {0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 1.0} and k ∈ {2, 4, . . . , 24}.
Figure 1(a),(b) shows the average revenue of the three approaches across 20 replicas of the experi-
ment as a function of the log of σ. Revenue is normalized so that the DC algorithm revenue is 1.0
when σ = 0.01. The error bars at one standard deviation are indistinguishable in the plot. It is
not surprising to see that in the linear scenario, the DC algorithm of [Mohri and Medina, 2014] and
the offset algorithm outperform RIC-h under low noise conditions. Both algorithms will recover a
solution close to the true weight vector 1. In this case the offset is minimal, thus recovering virtually
all revenue. On the other hand, even if we set the optimal reserve price for every cluster, the inherent
variance of each cluster makes us leave some revenue on the table. Nevertheless, notice that as the
noise increases all three algorithms seem to achieve the same revenue. This is due to the fact that
the variance in each cluster is comparable with the error in the prediction function h.
The results are reversed for the bimodal scenario where RIC-h outperforms both algorithms under
low noise. This is due to the fact that RIC-h recovers virtually all revenue obtained from high bids
while the offset and DC algorithms must set conservative prices to avoid losing revenue from lower
bids.
Auction data. In practice, however, neither of the synthetic regimes is fully representative of the
bidding patterns. In order to fully evaluate RIC-h, we collected auction bid data from AdExchange
for 4 different publisher-advertiser pairs. For each pair we sampled 100,000 examples with a set of
discrete and continuous features. The final feature vectors are in Rd for d ∈ [100, 200] depending
on the publisher-buyer pair. For each experiment, we extract a random training sample of 20,0000
points as well as a holdout and test sample. We repeated this experiment 20 times and present
the results on Figure 1 (c) where we have normalized the data so that the performance of the DC
algorithm is always 1. The error bars represent one standard deviation from the mean revenue
lift. Notice that our proposed algorithm achieves on average up to 30% improvement over the DC
algorithm. Moreover, the simple offset strategy never outperforms the clustering algorithm, and in
some cases achieves significantly less revenue.
8 Conclusion
We provided a simple, scalable reduction of the problem of revenue optimization with side infor-
mation to the well studied problem of minimizing the squared loss. Our reduction provides the first
polynomial time algoritm with a quantifiable bound on the achieved revenue. In the analysis of our
algorithm we also provided the first variance dependent lower bound on the revenue attained by set-
ting optimal monopoly prices. Finally, we provided extensive empirical evidence of the advantages
of RIC-h over the current state of theart.
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A Proof of Theorem 4
Recall that given any bid distribution F over [0, 1] we denote by G(r) = 1 − limr′→r− F (r′) the
probability that a bid is greater than or equal to r. Let x(q) = sup{x|G(x) ≥ q} denote the pseudo-
inverse of G. Notice in particular that when G is strictly decreasing then x = G−1. When it is clear
from context we will refer to a distribution indistinctly by F , G or x.
We will use the following expressions for the expected bid and second moment of a distribution.
Lemma 4. The expected bid and second moments of any distribution F are given respectively by:
B =
∫ 1
0
x(q)dq and s2 =
∫ 1
0
x(q)2dq.
Proof. We show the result only for the mean as the proof for the second moment is similar. It is well
known that for a positive random variable, the mean can be expressed as:
B =
∫ ∞
0
G(x)dx =
∫ ∞
0
∫ G(x)
0
dqdx =
∫
D
dqdx.
where D = {(x, q) | x > 0 and q ≤ G(x)}. Let D′ = {(x, q) | 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 and x ≤ x(q)}. It is
immediate that D ⊂ D′ as q ≤ G(x) implies by definition that x ≤ x(q). We can thus decompose
the above integral as: ∫
D
dqdx =
∫
D′
dqdx−
∫
D′−D
dqdx.
The proof will be complete by showing that D′ −D has Lebesgue measure 0. Indeed, in that case
the above expression reduces to:∫
D′
dqdx =
∫ 1
0
∫ x(q)
0
dxdq =
∫ 1
0
x(q)dq.
Let us then characterize points (x, q) ∈ D′ −D. Notice that if (x, q) /∈ D then G(x) < q but this
again by definition implies x ≥ x(q). If (x, q) is also in D′ then we must have x = x(q). From
which we conclude that limx′→x− G(x′) ≥ q > G(x). Thus (x, y) ∈ D′ − D implies that x is
a discontinuity of G. Finally, since G is decreasing there can be at most a countable number of
discontinuities and thus D′ −D has measure 0.
In order to show the bound of Theorem 4 holds, we consider the following optimization problem
over the space of square integrable functions L2[0, 1]:
min
x∈L2[0,1]
1
2
∫ 1
0
x2(q)dq (6)
s.t.
∫ 1
0
x(q) = B and R ≥ q x(q) ∀q.
We show that the value of this optimization problem is greater than 12
(
2R2e
S
R − R2). Since any
distribution x(q) achieving revenue R and separation S is feasible for (6) it follows that it must
satisfy σ2 = s2 −B2 ≥ 2R2e SR −B2 −R2.
Proposition 1. The objective value of (6) is lower bounded by:
B2
2
+ max
v∈L2[0,1]:v≥0
−1
2
(∫ 1
0
(qv(q))2 −
(∫ 1
0
qv(q)
)2)
+B
∫ 1
0
qv(q)−R
∫ 1
0
v(q). (7)
Proof. For any λ ∈ R and v ∈ L2[0, 1] define the Lagrangian
L(x, λ, v) =
1
2
∫ 1
0
x(q)2 − λ
∫ 1
0
x(q) + λB +
∫ 1
0
v(q)(q x(q)−R).
It is immediate to see that optimization problem (6) is equivalent to
min
x∈L2[0,1]
max
λ∈R,v≥0
L(x, λ, v) ≥ max
λ∈R,v≥0
min
x∈L2[0,1]
L(x, λ, v).
10
By taking variational derivatives of the function L with respect to x we see that the minimizing
solution x(q) satisfies:
x(q) = λ− qv(q).
Replacing this value in the function L we see that problem (6) is lower bounded by:
max
λ,v≥0
λB −R
∫ 1
0
v(q)− 1
2
∫ 1
0
(λ− qv(q))2
We can solve for the unconstrained variable λ to obtain λ = B +
∫ 1
0
qv(q). Replacing this value in
the above expression yields:
max
v≥0
−R
∫ 1
0
v(q) +
1
2
(∫ 1
0
qv(q) +B
)2
− 1
2
∫ 1
0
(qv(q))2.
Expanding the quadratic term yields:
B2
2
+ max
v≥0
−1
2
(∫ 1
0
(qv(q))2 −
(∫ 1
0
qv(q)
)2)
+B
∫ 1
0
qv(q)−R
∫ 1
0
v(q).
To obtain a lower bound on (7) we simply need to evaluate the objective function at a feasible
function v. In particular we let
v(q) =
R
q
[1
s
− 1
q
]
1q>s (8)
with s = e−
S
R . Notice that v is clearly in L2[0, 1] and v ≥ 0. The choice of this function is highly
motivated by the solution to the unconstrained version of problem (7).
Proposition 2. The optimization problem
max
v∈L2[0,1]:v≥0
−1
2
(∫ 1
0
(qv(q))2 −
(∫ 1
0
qv(q)
)2)
+B
∫ 1
0
qv(q)−R
∫ 1
0
v(q) (9)
is lower bounded by 12
(
2R2e
S
R −R2 −B2
)
.
Proof. Let v(q) be defined by (8). Using the fact that log s = − SR = R−BR we have the following
equalities:∫ 1
0
qv(q) = R
∫ 1
s
1
s
− 1
q
= R
(1− s
s
+ log(s)
)
=
R
s
−B (10)∫ 1
0
v(q) = R
(
− log s
s
+
(
1− 1
s
))
=
R
s
(s− 1− log s) = B +R(s− 2)
s
. (11)
In view of (10) and (11) we have that for all q ≥ s
q2v(q)− q
∫ 1
s
qv(q) =
Rq
s
−R− Rq
s
+Bq = Bq −R
Multiplying the above equality by v(q) and integrating we see the objective function of (9) evaluated
at v(q) is given by
1
2
(
B
∫ 1
0
qv(q)−R
∫ 1
0
v(q)
)
.
Replacing (10) and (11) on the expression above we obtain:
1
2
(BR
s
−B2 − RB +R
2(s− 2)
s
)
=
1
2
(2R2
s
−R2 −B2
)
=
1
2
(
2R2e
S
R −R2 −B2
)
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B Additional proofs
Lemma 1. Let r : X → [0, 1] be defined by r(x) := max(h(x) − η2/3, 0). The function r then
satisfies
S(r) ≤ η1/2 + 2η2/3.
Proof. By definition of S and r we have:
S(r) = E[b− r(x)1b≥r(x)] = E[b− r(x)] + E[r(x)1b<r(x)]
≤ E[b− h(x)] + E[h(x)− r(x)] + P (b < r(x))
≤ η1/2 + η2/3 + P (h(x)− b > η2/3) (12)
≤ η1/2 + η2/3 + E
[
(h(x)− b)2]
η4/3
= η1/2 + 2η2/3, (13)
where (12) is a consequence of Jensen’s inequality and we used Markov’s inequality in (13).
Corollary 2. The following bound holds for any distribution F:
S ≤ (3R)1/3σ2/3 ≤ (3B)1/3σ2/3
Proof. By Theorem 4 and using a third order Taylor expansion we have:
σ2 ≥ 2R2e SR −R2 −B2
≥ 2R2
(
1 +
S
R
+
S2
2R2
+
S3
6R3
)
−B2 −R2
= 2R2 + 2RS + S2 +
S3
3R
−B2 −R2
= (S −R)2 −B2 + S
3
3R
=
S3
3R
.
The proof follows by rearranging terms.
Theorem 5. For any distribution F with mean B and variance σ2, the maximum revenue with
monopoly reserves, R, satisfies:
B
R
≤ 4.78 + 2 log (1 + σ2
B2
)
Proof. Let α = BR . Note that α ≥ 1. We begin by dividing both sides of the statement of 4 by R2:
σ2
B2
α2 + α2 − 2eα−1 ≥ −1
Rearranging, we have:
σ2
B2
α2 + α2 ≥ 2eα−1 − 1. (14)
Since α ≥ 1, eα−1 ≥ 1. Therefore, if Equation 14 holds, then:
σ2
B2
α2 + α2 ≥ eα−1
⇔ α
√
1 +
σ2
B2
≥ eα−12
⇔ 2√e
√
1 +
σ2
B2
≥ e
α/2
α/2
Suppose ex/x ≤ t for some fixed t ≥ 2√e. Note that the function ex/x is increasing in x for
x ≥ 1. Moreover, at x = 2 log t > 1 we have ex/x = t2/(2 log t) ≥ t, since t > 2 log t for t > 2.
Therefore x ≤ 2 log t.
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In our situation, we can then conclude that
α ≤ 4 log
(
2
√
e
√
1 +
σ2
B2
)
< 4.78 + 2 log
(
1 +
σ2
B2
)
.
Lemma 3. Let h be a function such that 1m
∑m
i=1(h(xi)−bi)2 ≤ η̂2, and let C∗ denote the partition
that minimizes Φ(C). If Ch minimizes Φh(C) then
Φ(Ch) ≤ Φ(C∗) + 4mη̂.
Proof. From definition of Φ(C) and a straightforward application of the triangle inequality we have:
Φ(Ch) =
k∑
j=1
√ ∑
i,i′:xi,xi′∈Chj
(bi − bi′)2
≤
k∑
j=1
√ ∑
i,i′:xi,xi′∈Chj
(h(xi)− h(xi′))2 +
√ ∑
i,i′:xi,xi′∈Chj
(h(xi)− bi)2 +
√ ∑
i,i′:xi,xi′∈Chj
(h(xi′)− bi′)2
= Φh(Ch) + 2
k∑
j=1
√
mj
∑
i:xi∈Chj
(h(xi)− bi)2
≤ Φh(Ch) + 2
√
m
√√√√√ k∑
j=1
∑
i:xi∈Chj
(h(xi)− bi)2,
where we have used Cauchy-Schwarz inequality for the last line. Using the property of h we can
further bound the above expression as
Φ(Ch) ≤ Φh(Ch) + 2mη̂
≤ Φh(C∗) + 2mη̂, (15)
where we have used the fact that Ch minimizes Φh. Proceeding in the same manner as before, it is
easy to see that Φh(C∗) ≤ Φ(C∗) + 2mη̂. Replacing this bound in (15) we recover the statement of
the lemma.
C Dynamic Program
Lemma 5. Let y1 ≤ . . . ≤ ym, there exists an algorithm with time complexity in O(km2) that finds
a set of indices i0 = 1 ≤ i1 ≤ . . . ik−1 ≤ ik = m minimizing
Φ(i0, . . . , ik) =
l∑
j=1
√√√√√ ij∑
i,i′=ij−1
(yi − y′i)2
Proof. For every l ≤ k and r ≤ m define
Al,r = min
i0=1≤...≤il=r
k∑
j=1
√√√√√ ij∑
i,i′=ij−1
(yi − y′i)2
It is clear that Ak,m is equal to the minimum of Φ. We now show that Al,r satisfies the recursion:
Al,r = min
r′<r
Al−1,r′ +
√√√√ r∑
i,i′=r′+1
(yi − yi′)2.
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Let i0 ≤ . . . ≤ il denote the set of indices defining Al,r notice that by definition
Al−1,il−1 ≤
l−1∑
j=1
√√√√√ ij∑
i,i′=ij=1
(yi − yi′)2.
Therefore
min
r′<r
Al−1,r′ +
√√√√ r∑
i,i′=r′+1
(yi − yi′)2 ≤ Al−1,il−1 +
√√√√ r∑
i,i′=il−1
(yi − y′i)2
≤ Al,r.
The reverse inequality is trivial. We have thus shown that calculatingAk,m requires finding all values
Al,r and each value can be calculated in O(m) time. Therefore, the complexity of the algorithm is
in O(km2).
D Lower Bounds
Lemma 6. For any  > 0 there exists a distribution F such that B −R ≥ (3B)1/3σ2/3 − .
Proof. Let R = 1 and consider a distribution G given by G(x) = 1 for x < 1 and G(x) = 1x for
x ∈ [R,M ]. We then have that the optimal revenue is given by 1 and the mean of this distribution is
B =
∫ M
0
G(x) = 1 + logM.
On the other hand the second moment of the distribution is given by
2
∫ M
0
xG(x) = 1 + 2
(
1− 1
M
)
.
Therefore the variance of the distribution is given by:
σ2 = 2
(
1− 1
M
− logM − logM
2
2
)
Using the fact that 1M = e
− logM and using the Taylor expansion of x 7→ ex around 0 we see that
the variance is roughly log
3M
3 + o(log
3M)as M → 1. Since B − R∗ = logM it follows that for
any  > 0 there exists M close to 1 such that B −R∗ ≥ (3R∗)1/3σ2/3 − .
E Complexity Bounds
Theorem 3. The growth function of the class G(h, k) can be bounded as:
Π(G(h, k),m) ≤ m
2k
kk
.
Proof. Let S ′ = ((x1, z1), . . . , (xm, zm)) denote a sample.Let G = {(sign(g(x1) −
z1), . . . , sign(g(xm) − zm)
)|g ∈ G(h, k)}. We proceed to bound the cardinality of G. Notice that
a partition t ∈ Tk can divide the set of predictions h(x1), . . . , h(xm) into at most mk−1 different
ways. Indeed, this is immediate as a k-partition of [0, 1] is defined by k − 1 points t1, . . . , tk−1 and
each ti has at most m distinct places to be placed. Now, fix a partition t ∈ Tk and let Ij = [tj−1, tj ].
Let (possibly after relabeling) h(x1), . . . , h(xmj ) denote the points that fall in interval Ij . Notice
that all points falling in Ij share the same reserve price rj thus the number of labelings that can be
obtained in interval j are equal to∣∣{(sign(rj − z1), . . . , sign(rj − zmj ))|rj ∈ R}∣∣ = mj
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Therefore for a fixed partition there are at most
∏k
j=1mj ≤
(
m
k
)k
labelings. Since there are at
most mk−1 partitions then we must have:
Π(G(h, k)) ≤ m
2k−1
kk
15
